Supervisory capital standards: modernise or redesign? by Edgar Meister




I. I am delighted to have the opportunity to speak to
such an eminent group at this important conference on
capital regulation.
“If you see a banker jump out of the window,
jump after him: there is sure to be profit in it,” said the
eighteenth-century French philosopher Voltaire. Looking
at the situation in Southeast Asia, I am not entirely con-
vinced that it would always be wise to follow Voltaire’s
advice. Even if all banks pursue the same course, their
actions are not necessarily appropriate.
It is also becoming clear, however, that the Asian
crisis has given new urgency to the already important
topics of risk and capital adequacy. In that respect, this
conference has come at a very opportune moment.
The question addressed by this conference is
whether the prudential supervisory standard established by
the 1988 Basle Capital Accord can meet the challenges of
the twenty-first century. If an entirely new standard is
needed, then our task is to consider which alternative sys-
tem of capital requirements might be superior to the
present one. There are differences of opinion on these
issues, not only between the supervised institutions and
the supervisors but also, in some cases, among the supervi-
sors themselves.
In debating whether it is better to modernise the
Basle Accord or to redesign it by developing a new set of
capital rules, we need to keep two considerations in mind:
• A capital standard should promote the security of indi-
vidual institutions—that is, each institution’s ability
to manage risk and to maintain an adequate cushion
of capital against losses—and the overall stability of
the banking system. I assume that no one wants less
financial market stability than we have now.
• The easing of regulatory burdens and the creation
of a level playing field for banks are important
objectives. Although the extent of the regulatory
burdens imposed by different capital standards should
not be the main criterion in deciding whether to
modernise or redesign the Basle Accord, efforts to
streamline regulation are welcome because they reduce
the competitive disadvantages experienced by banks and
optimise the cost-effectiveness of the supervisory
system. A related consideration is that any prudential
measures taken should not create competitive dis-
crepancies between different groups of banks.
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II. In terms of risk considerations, an ideal capital stan-
dard would fully capture an institution’s risks and would
produce a capital base that takes due account of risk. An
ideal standard would also increase market discipline. In
reality, we are still far away from these theoretical ideals.
There are differences in the measurability and hence also in
the controllability of the main risks to which banks and
other financial intermediaries are exposed. Market risks, for
example, can be measured quite accurately using existing
data and risk-monitoring techniques.
By contrast, in what is still the main risk area
for banks, credit risk, a purely quantitative determination
of risk—comparable to market risk modeling—is much
more difficult and has not yet been achieved. For that
reason, assessment of credit risk still relies heavily on
traditional methods—that is, the judgement of the
banks’ credit officers.
Efforts to improve the quantification of credit risk
through the use of models are mainly hampered by insuf-
ficient or poor-quality data. For that reason, the survey of
data sources for credit risk models that was recently
released by the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association (ISDA) is very welcome. It remains to be seen,
however, whether the quality of the data in major market
segments will be adequate.
Data problems also complicate the modeling of
operational risks. These risks range from the inadequate
segregation of duties to fraud and errors in data processing.
At present, measures of these risks are “guesstimates” based
largely on data not objectively observable.
III. The difficulties in risk measurement are a problem
not only for institutions, but also for the supervisory
agencies that define capital requirements. Our existing
regulatory framework aims to ensure that institutions have
an adequate cushion of capital as a protection against
unavoidable losses. Although this “shield” of capital is sup-
posed to cover all risk factors—including operational and
legal risks—the calculation of required capital has essen-
tially been geared to a single risk factor: default risk. At
the beginning of this year, separate capital requirements
were implemented for banks’ market risk exposures, but
default risk remains the primary target of capital rules.
Bankers and some supervisors have recently called
the Capital Accord into question, not least because of its
inexact categorisation of risks. They point out, for example,
that exposures to countries in the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development are assigned a uniform risk
weight of 0 percent, although there are considerable differ-
ences in risk within that group of countries. Similar ques-
tions arise about the assignment of a 100 percent risk weight
to exposures to nonbanks, a group that includes blue-chip
firms known worldwide. Additionally, critics claim that risk
weights under the Basle Accord do not take into account the
degree of diversification in individual institution’s loan
books—an oversight that may prevent institutions from
using their funds in the most productive way.
IV. This is the backdrop against which more sophisti-
cated methods of credit risk measurement are being dis-
cussed. These methods include a subtly differentiated
prudential weighting scheme, the use of internal ratings,
the inclusion of portfolio effects and credit risk models,
and certain new concepts completely different from the
Capital Accord. It is my assessment that supervisors are
fundamentally open-minded about these alternatives.
Notable among the new concepts are the precommitment
approach put forward by economists from the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System and a framework
that emphasises self-regulation, proposed by the Group of
Thirty (G-30).
Under the precommitment approach, a bank itself
decides how much capital it will hold within a given
period to cover the risks arising from its trading book.
Sanctions will apply if the accumulated losses exceed that
amount. This approach is appealing in many respects. It
could ease the job of supervisors and reduce the regulatory
burden for institutions. Moreover, the approach is highly
market-oriented.
The precommitment approach poses a number of
fundamental difficulties, however. First, it involves a
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This perspective means that supervisory authorities are
reacting to market outcomes and to choices already made
by an institution rather than specifying a given level of
capital for the institution in a preventive manner. Without
wishing to preempt this afternoon’s discussion, I would
argue that some institutions facing regulatory sanctions for
failing to commit sufficient capital to cover their losses
might be motivated to accept additional risk—on the
theory that “If you are in trouble, double.”
A second problem with the precommitment
approach is the difficulty of finding a logically consistent
penalising mechanism. If an institution takes risks that
result in losses greater than the capital reserved, banking
supervisors would have to impose mandatory fines or
higher capital requirements, which would end up exacer-
bating the financial difficulties of that institution.
Another penalty contemplated under the precom-
mitment scheme—public disclosure—points to a third
problem with this approach. The idea that an institution
could be required to inform the market if it failed to limit
its losses has met with considerable reservations on the part
of many institutions and supervisory authorities. I am
quite doubtful whether institutions would be prepared to
go that far in terms of disclosure. At the risk of exaggera-
tion, I would suggest that the precommitment approach
represents a bank’s promise that it will not become insol-
vent. If that promise cannot be kept, then the question
whether supervisors can or will impose sanctions remains
open—at least in critical cases.
A proposal by the G-30, which goes further than
the precommitment approach in reducing the role of bank
supervisors, essentially leaves the development of regula-
tory strategies to the market or to a small group of major
international financial institutions. The involvement of
supervised institutions in the creation of regulatory stan-
dards is not new in principle; it has been tried and tested.
Whenever industry methods of measuring and monitoring
risk have become state of the art, supervisors have been
ready to adopt them—as was recently the case with the rec-
ognition of internal models for market risk. Nevertheless,
in the absence of administrative sanctions to enforce stan-
dards, how binding could those standards be?
Trusting solely in effective market controls pre-
supposes a comparatively high degree of transparency.
As in the case of the precommitment approach, it is ques-
tionable whether all market players would be prepared to
disclose their risk positions and losses to the market. Such
disclosures would require institutions to reveal market
expectations, trading strategies, and other business secrets.
Furthermore, under the G-30 proposal, the inter-
ests of the select group of member institutions might not
prove to be identical with the general interests of the finan-
cial industry. In particular, competitive distortions at the
expense of smaller institutions might arise. As mentioned
above, an outcome in which supervisory standards cause
new competitive problems should at all events be avoided.
V. As concepts, the precommitment approach and the
G-30 proposal for self-regulation supply important and
thought-provoking ideas. Because of their pronounced
market orientation, these alternatives to the present pru-
dential standard would reduce the regulatory burden and
give banks greater freedom in their risk management.
At the same time—in addition to the reservations
already mentioned—I perceive the danger of a decline in
the overall security level of the individual credit institution
and the banking system. Existing risks might be covered
by less capital than under the Capital Accord.
Although self-regulation aimed at greater market
discipline would be welcome, the precommitment approach
and G-30 proposal would probably not be able to achieve it on
a lasting basis—especially if a bank or a banking system were
in a difficult situation. In such a situation, these alternative
approaches would not be able to make up for the disadvan-
tages of allowing institutions to maintain a lower capital base.
What should also be given consideration is that
both approaches are intended to apply mainly to large
banks that operate internationally. These institutions are
players with an especially prominent role in maintaining
the stability of the financial markets. At the same time, we
know that the world of risk has become more complex
during the last few years and that the risks borne by insti-
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high-yield transactions in emerging markets, for example,
are likely to become increasingly significant in the future
despite the recent turmoil in Asia.
Indeed, the events in Southeast Asia demonstrate
how difficult it is to determine bank-specific risks with
sufficient accuracy. Even leading rating agencies have
tended to run behind the markets in line with the maxim
“Please follow me, I am right behind you.”
VI. Capital is, therefore, still a modern prudential require-
ment. The Basle Capital Accord is, in this context, a rough
and comparatively simple approach. This standard, which
has now been put into practice virtually worldwide,
undoubtedly has some weaknesses. It has, however, demon-
strated its suitability under changing conditions in the
almost ten years since its introduction. In my view, the
empirical findings are definitely positive.
The Capital Accord has not worked, however,
when the calculated capital was not actually in place. In many
countries that have experienced crises, credit institutions had
only formally fulfilled the norm of 8 percent minimum
capital. An evaluation of actual assets and liabilities in
line with market conditions would have shown that the
capital had been used up long beforehand.
Because the Capital Accord sets capital require-
ments more conservatively than do the precommitment
approach and the G-30 proposal, there remains a buffer
for cushioning the risks that are difficult to measure—
operational and legal risks, for instance. To that extent, an
adequate cushion of capital can make up for shortcomings
in risk identification, measurement, and control.
VII. To come back to the original question: I am in
favour of an evolutionary solution. The Basle Accord
should be modernised and not—at present—replaced by
other concepts. Other approaches are indeed worth discuss-
ing, but at present I cannot identify any alternative that
would be operationally viable, practicable, and superior to
the Capital Accord.
The Capital Accord itself is adaptable enough to
allow new developments in the markets to be integrated
with its system in a meaningful manner—as occurred in
the case of market risk, for example. It can also accommo-
date all other developments currently under discussion,
such as on-balance-sheet netting, credit derivatives, credit
risk models, and new capital elements.
The capital requirements established by the Basle
Accord will, of course, have to be expanded to include buff-
ers for risks that have so far gone uncovered. For example,
given an easing of capital requirements in other areas,
buffers for operational risks, valuation risks, and concentra-
tion risks must no longer be a “no-go” area.
Generally speaking, further qualitative requirements
may also help to curb risks and hence create a stabilising
impact in micro- and macro-prudential terms. In that respect,
the Basle Committee’s “Framework for the Evaluation of
Internal Control Systems” is especially important. Qualitative
and quantitative minimum standards for the use of credit risk
models—validated through extensive testing and applica-
tion—would also have to be specified in due course.
In my view, self-regulation can have a stimulating
effect, but it cannot replace the administrative supervision
of banks and other financial intermediaries. To that extent,
self-regulation is an approach that complements prudential
supervision. I believe that this assessment has been rein-
forced by various bank crises in the past and borne out yet
again by the Asian crisis.
A revised capital framework incorporating greater
self-regulation requires that supervisors work closely with
financial institutions. Such cooperation should yield regu-
lations that are, on the one hand, up-to-date and compatible
with the market and, on the other hand, conducive to
market discipline and the stability of the overall system.
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